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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-PLEA WITHDRAWAL:
GROUNDS FOR ALLOWANCE-NORTH DAKOTA ADOPTS THE
MINORITY RULE REGARDING COURT NOTIFICATION OF A
SEX OFFENDER'S DUTY TO REGISTER
State v. Breiner, 562 N.W.2d 565 (N.D. 1997)
I. FACTS
Jon Karter Breiner was charged with a class A misdemeanor under
section 12.1-20-05 of the North Dakota Century Code, which prohibits
engaging in a sexual act with a minor between the ages of fifteen and
eighteen.' On May 1, 1996, Breiner's counsel moved to allow Breiner to
enter a guilty plea.2 The trial court then advised Breiner of his statutory
and constitutional rights. 3 In addition, the trial court asked Breiner if his
1. State v. Breiner, 562 N.W.2d 565, 566 (N.D. 1997) (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-05
(1985)). This statute has since been amended by the North Dakota Legislature. See N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 12.1-20-05 (1997). These changes became effective on August 1, 1997. Id. If Breiner had not
plead guilty, the State asserted that it had evidence in the form of a blood analysis which showed with
99.999% probability that Breiner fathered a child with the then 15 year old victim. Record at 19-20,
Breiner, 562 N.W.2d 565 (N.D. 1997) (No. 960298).
2. Breiner, 562 N.W.2d at 566.
3. Id. In doing so, the trial court sought to comply with Rule 1 (b) of the North Dakota Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which provides:
(b) Advice to defendant. The court may not accept a plea of guilty without first, by
addressing the defendant personally [except as provided in Rule 43(c)] in open
court, informing the defendant of and determining that the defendant understands
the following:
(1) The nature of the charge to which the plea is offered;
(2) The mandatory minimum punishment, if any, and the maximum possible
punishment provided by the statute defining the offense to which the plea is
offered;
(3) That the defendant has the right to plead not guilty, or persist in that plea if it
has already been made, or to plead guilty;
(4) That if the defendant pleads guilty there will not be a further trial of any kind,
so that by pleading guilty the defendant waives the right to a trial by jury or
otherwise and the right to be confronted with adverse witnesses; and
(5) If the defendant is not represented by an attorney, that the defendant has the
right to be represented by an attorney at every stage of the proceeding
against the defendant and, if necessary, one will be appointed to represent the
defendant, as provided in Rule 44, North Dakota Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
N.D. R. C RIM. P. 11 (b) (1998). Rule 11 of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure is similar to
Rule II of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. N.D. R. CRIM. P. 11 (explanatory note). The
North Dakota Supreme Court has relied upon the Explanatory Note to Rule 11 (b) to state that Rule
1 (b) largely codifies the principles in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). State v. Hagemann,
326 N.W.2d 861, 865 (N.D. 1982) (citing Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242 (holding that defendants must be
apprised of their relinquishment of certain constitutional rights when they plead guilty)).
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change in plea was voluntary. 4 The trial court then explained that the
charge was a class A misdemeanor with a maximum penalty of one year
in jail and a $1,000 fine.5
After accepting the guilty plea, the trial court sentenced Breiner to
twelve months in prison, but suspended six months during two years of
supervised probation. 6 The trial court did not express in the judgment
or in any other court record that Breiner must register as a sexual
offender for the next ten years under section 12.1-32-15 of the North
Dakota Century Code.7
4. Breiner, 562 N.W.2d at 566. The trial court did this to comply with Rule 1 (c), which requires
courts to personally address the defendant in open court to determine that the plea is voluntary and not
the result of force or threats. N.D. R. C RIM. P. 11 (c). Rule 1 (c) also requires the court to inquire if
the plea resulted from a plea agreement. Id. Rule 11 (c) codifies the rule in McCarthy v. United
States, 394 U.S. 459, 466-67 (1969), which held that courts must personally address the defendant to
determine the voluntariness of their plea under Rule II of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
N.D. R. CRIM. P. 11 (c) (explanatory note).
5. Id. See N.D. R. CRIM. P. II (b)(2). A trial court is not required to advise of a minimum pos-
sible sentence under Rule I l(b)(2) of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure, but only advise
of the mandatory minimum punishment. State v. Hamann, 262 N.W.2d 495, 501 (N.D. 1978).
6. Breiner, 562 N.W.2d at 566.
7. Id. Section 12.1-32-15 of the North Dakota Century Code provides:
3. After a person has pled guilty to or been found guilty of a crime against a child or an
attempted crime against a child, or after a person has pled guilty or been found guilty as
a sexual offender, the court shall impose, in addition to any penalty provided by law, a
requirement that the person register, within ten days of coming into a county in which the
person resides or is temporarily domiciled, with the chief of police of the city or the
sheriff of the county if the person resides in an area other than a city. The, court shall
require a person to register by stating the requirement on the court records. A person
must also register if that person:
a. Is incarcerated or is on probation or parole on August 1, 1995, for a crime
against a child or as a sex offender;
b. Has pled guilty or nolo contendre to, or been found guilty of, an offense in a
court of another state or the federal government equivalent to those offenses set
forth in subdivision a and c of subsection i; or
c. Has pled guilty to or been found guilty of a crime against a child or as a sexual
offender within ten years prior to August 1, 1995.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-15(3) (1997). Under North Dakota's registration statute, the official in
charge of a correctional facility is required to provide future registrants with information explaining
their duty to register and obtain the address where registrants expects to reside prior to their discharge,
parole, or release. Id. § 12.1-32-15(4). This official must then supply this information to the attorney
general 45 days before the offender's release. Id. The attorney general forwards a copy of this infor-
mation, at least 30 days prior to the offender's release, to the law enforcement agency having juris-
diction over the registrant's expected address, the prosecutor who prosecuted the registrant, and the
court in which the registrant was convicted or pled guilty. Id.
If a registrant is sentenced to probation, a fine, or both and is subsequently released by a court,
the court is required to inform a registrant of the duty to register, obtain the registrant's expected ad-
dress, and forward the information to the attorney general within three days. Id. § 12.1- 32- 5(5). The
attorney general then informs the law enforcement agency having jurisdiction over that address. Id.
Under this statute, registration consists of a written statement signed by the registrant, the
registrant's fingerprints, photographs of the registrant, and any other information required by the
attorney general. Id. § 12.1-32-15(6). If a registrant changes his or her name or address, he or she
must inform, in writing, the law enforcement agency with whom he or she last registered and any
agency having jurisdiction over the registrant's new address within 10 days of the change. Id. Within
three days of receipt, this information is forwarded to the attorney general, who also forwards a copy
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On June 15, 1996, Breiner wrote the trial court relating that he was
unaware of the registration requirement at trial, and that if he had been,
he would not have plead guilty. 8 Breiner claimed he first learned of the
registration requirement from state penitentiary officials when he was
imprisoned. 9
Shortly thereafter, Breiner's attorney formally moved to withdraw
his guilty plea.10 The trial court concluded that Breiner failed to show a
"manifest injustice" under Rule 32(d) of the North Dakota Rules of
Criminal Procedure in the court's acceptance of the guilty plea and
denied the motion. II Breiner then appealed the ruling to the North
Dakota Supreme Court.12
On appeal, a plurality of the North Dakota Supreme Court held that
a trial court's failure to advise a defendant of his or her statutory duty
to register under section 12.1-32-15 of the North Dakota Century Code,
prior to accepting a defendant's guilty plea, is grounds to allow a
to any law enforcement agency having jurisdiction over the registrant's new address. Id. These
provisions also apply in any other state that requires registration. Id. This registration requirement is
imposed for a period of 10 years from the date of sentencing or after release from incarceration,
whichever is later. Id. § 12.1-32-15(7)(a). However, if a registrant is classified a "sexually violent
predator," the registration requirement can only be lifted by a court order. Id. § 12.1-32-15(7)(b).
An individual who violates this statute is guilty of a class A misdemeanor with a minimum man-
datory sentence of 90 days in jail and one year probation. Id. § 12.1-32-15(8). Repeat violators of this
statute will be found guilty of a class C felony. Id. In addition, any sex offender who fails to register
and is on parole or probation will also have these privileges revoked. Id. § 12.1-32-15(9).
In regard to disclosure, this statute requires law enforcement agencies to disclose to the public
any "relevant and necessary" registration information if the agency determines that disclosure is
"necessary for public protection." Id. § 12.1-32-15(11). In addition, a law enforcement agency may
disclose nonregistration information to the public which includes the offender's name and last known
address, the offense(s) to which the offender was found guilty of, or pled guilty to, the date of the
judgment or order imposing sentence, and if known, any disposition of a sentence. Id. The statute also
requires that an offender's registration statement, photographs, and fingerprints be open for public
inspection. Id. § 12.1-32-15(9).
8. Breiner, 562 N.W.2d at 566. Breiner's letter to the trial court states:
[T]he problem is sir, that no-one [sic] told me that I would have to registar [sic] as a sex
offender, and under that reason alone I would have not plead guilty without a change by
the States [sic] attorney or by going to trial. So I would please like a court appointed
attorney so that I can have help in removing my plea of guilty. Which would not have




11. Id. Under Rule 32(d)(1) of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure, courts must allow
defendants to withdraw a guilty plea if the motion is timely and the withdrawal is necessary to correct
a "manifest injustice." N.D. R. CRIM. P. 32(d)(1) (1998). A motion for withdrawal is timely if made
with due diligence considering the nature of the allegations. N.D. R. CRtM. P. 32(d)(2). However, if
the withdrawal motion is made before sentencing, the court in its discretion may allow the defendant to
withdraw a plea for any "fair and just reason" unless the prosecution has been substantially prejudiced
by reliance upon the defendant's plea. N.D. R. C RIM. P. 32(d)(3). Rule 32 of the North Dakota Rules
of Criminal Procedure is similar to Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and adapted
from the A.B.A. Standards relating to Pleas of Guilty, sections 2.1(a), 2.1(a)(1), 2.1(b). N.D.R.CRIM.
P. 32(d) (explanatory note).
12. Breiner, 562 N.W.2d at 566.
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defendant to withdraw a guilty plea.13 In doing so, the plurality found
that a trial court's failure to advise a defendant of this direct conse-
quence of conviction constitutes a "manifest injustice" under Rule
32(d) of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure. 1
4
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. WITHDRAWAL OF A GUILTY PLEA AS A "MANIFEST INJUSTICE"
UNDER RULE 32(D) OF THE NORTH DAKOTA RULES OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE
Rule 32(d) of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure allows
a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea when it "is necessary to correct a
manifest injustice."15 The determination of what constitutes a manifest
injustice is typically within a trial court's discretion and is only reversed
on appeal for an abuse of that discretion. 16 An abuse of discretion oc-
curs when the court's discretion is not exercised in the interest of jus-
tice.17 A manifest injustice includes procedural errors by the sentencing
court. 18
A failure to substantially comply with Rule 11 of the North Dakota
Rules of Criminal Procedure is a procedural error which can constitute a
"manifest injustice" under Rule 32(d) of the North Dakota Rules of
Criminal Procedure.1 9 For instance, a "manifest injustice" includes a
failure to substantially comply with Rule 11(b) of the North Dakota
Rules of Criminal Procedure by failing to properly advise a defendant. 20
However, the trial court's duty to advise defendants under Rule 11 (b) of
13. Id. at 567.
14. Id.
15. N.D. R. CRIM. P. 32(d).
16. State v. Gunwall, 522 N.W.2d 183, 185 (N.D. 1994) (citing State v. Boushee, 459 N.W.2d
552, 556 (N.D. 1990)); see also State v. Dalman, 520 N.W.2d 860, 862 (N.D. 1994); State v. Trieb,
516 N.W.2d 287, 290 (N.D. 1994); Houle v. State, 482 N.W.2d 24, 25 (N.D. 1992); State v.
Schumacher, 452 N.W.2d 345, 348 (N.D. 1990).
17. Dalman, 520 N.W.2d at 862 (citing Trieb, 516 N.W.2d at 290-291); see also Houle, 482
N.W.2d at 25; Schumacher, 452 N.W.2d at 348.
18. Gunwall, 522 N.W.2d at 185 (citing Boushee, 459 N.W.2d at 556).
19. Gunwall, 522 N.W.2d at 186 (finding that the record did not support the defendant's claim
that a "manifest injustice" occurred because he failed to understand the consequences of his guilty
plea); see also Boushee, 459 N.W.2d at 556.
20. Gunwall, 522 N.W.2d at 186 (finding that a trial court which reminded a defendant during a
change of plea hearing of the court's advice at arraignment complied with Rule I l(b) of the North
Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure); see also Boushee, 459 N.W.2d at 556 (finding that the trial
court's failure to substantially comply with Rule 11 (b) of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal
Procedure constituted a "manifest injustice"); Schumacher, 452 N.W.2d at 348 (holding a "manifest
injustice" occurred because of the trial court's failure to advise the defendant of the mandatory
minimum sentence in accordance with Rule Il(b)(2) of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal
Procedure).
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the consequences of their guilty pleas is limited to direct, not collateral,
consequences. 2 1
B. MAJORITY VIEW: SEX REGISTRATION STATUTES AS A COLLATERAL
CONSEQUENCE
Presently, all fifty states and the District of Columbia have
sex-offender registration statutes. 22 Courts in several of these states have
held that registration of a sex offender is a collateral, rather than a direct,
consequence of a conviction of which defendants need not be advised by
trial courts. 23 The distinction between "direct" and "collateral" conse-
quences of a plea has been defined as turning "on whether the result
21. Dalman, 520 N.W.2d at 863 (holding that deportation is a collateral consequence of which
defendants need not be advised under Rule 1 1(b)(2) of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal
Procedure); Houle, 482 N.W.2d at 30 (holding that parole eligibility is a collateral consequence of
which defendants need not be advised under Rule 1 1(b) of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal
Procedure).
22. See ALA. CODE §§ 13A-1 1-200 to 203 (1994); ALASKA STAT. §§ 12.63.010 to 12.63.100,
18.65.087 (Michie 1996); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-3821 to 13-3826 (West 1989 & Supp. 1997);
ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 12-12-901 to 12-12-920 (Michie Supp. 1997); CAL. PENAL CODE § 290 to 290.9
(West 1988 & Supp. 1998); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-412.5 (1997); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
54-102r (West Supp. 1996); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. I 1 § 4120 (1995 & Supp. 1996); D.C. CODE ANN. §§
24-1101 to 24-1117 (Supp. 1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.21 (West Supp. 1998); GA. CODE ANN. §
42-1-12 (Harrison Supp. 1997); HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-743 (Supp. 1996); IDAHOCODE §§ 18-8301 to
18-8311 (1997); 730 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. 150/1 to 150/10 (West 1997); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 5-2-12-1
to 5-2-12-13 (Michie 1997); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 692A.1 to 692A.15 (West Supp. 1997); KAN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 22-4901 to 22-4909 (Supp. 1997); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 17.500 to 17.540 (Michie 1996);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15.540 to 549 (West Supp. 1998); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-A, §§ 11001 to
11144 (West Supp. 1997); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 792 (Supp. 1997); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 22c,
§ 37 (West 1994); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 28.721 to 28.732 (West 1994 & Supp. 1997); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 243.166 (West Supp. 1998); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 45-33-1 to 45-33-19 (Supp. 1997); Mo.
ANN. STAT. §§ 589.400 to 589.425 (West Supp. 1998); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-23-501 to 46-23-511
(1997); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-4001 to 29-4013 (Supp. 1996); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 179D.350 to
179D.490 (Michie Supp. 1998); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 651-B:1 to 651-B:9 (Supp. 1997); N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 2C:7-1 to 2C:7-11 (West 1995 & Supp. 1997); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-11A-I to 29-1IA-8
(Michie 1997); N.Y. CORRECT. LAW §§ 168 to 168-v (McKinney Supp. 1997); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§
14-208.5 to 14-208.25 (Supp. 1997); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-15 (1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§
2950.01 to 2950.99 (Anderson 1996 & Supp. 1997); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, §§ 581 to 588 (West
Supp. 1998); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 181.594 to 181.605 (1997); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, §§ 9791 to 9799.5
(West Supp. 1996); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-37.1-1 to 11-37.1-19 (Supp. 1997); S.C. CODE ANN. §§
23-3-400 to 23-3-490 (Law Co-op Supp. 1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-22-31 to 22-22-41 (Michie
Supp. 1997); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-39-101 to 40-39-110 (1997); TEX. CODE CRim. P. ANN. art. 62.01
to 62.12 (West Supp. 1998); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-27-21.5 (Supp. 1997); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 §§
5401 to 5413 (Supp. 1997); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-298.1 to 19.2-298.3, 19.2-390.1 (Michie 1995 &
Supp. 1996); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9A.44.130 to 9A.44.140, 4.24.550 (West Supp. 1998); W. VA.
CODE §§ 61-8F-1 to 61-8F-10 (1997); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 301.45 to 301.46 (West Supp. 1997); Wyo.
STAT. ANN. §§ 7-19-301 to 306 (Michie 1997).
States which do not institute a sex offender registration program in compliance with the criteria
set forth in 42 U.S.C.A. § 14071 forfeit a portion of the federal drug control grants allocated to them
under 42 U.S.C.A. § 3756. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 14071(g)(2)(A) (Supp. 1998). States had until
September 13, 1997 to implement their programs. Id. § 1407 1(g)(1).
23. See State v. Young, 542 P.2d 20, 22 (Ariz. 1975); In re B.G.M., 929 S.W.2d 604, 606-07
(Tex. App. 1996); State v. Ward, 869 P.2d 1062, 1076 (Wash. 1994); Johnson v. State, 922 P.2d 1384,
1387 (Wyo. 1996); see also Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 406 n.18 (N.J. 1995) (supporting the
conclusion that registration is a collateral consequence of conviction).
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represents a definite, immediate and largely automatic effect on the
range of the defendant's punishment." 24 Hence, the general reasoning
of these cases is that the requirement to register is largely regulatory or
remedial, and not punitive in purpose. 25 In addition, many cases utilize
this same reasoning in determining the constitutionality of the retroactive
application of registration and notification laws under state and the
federal Ex Post Facto Clauses.26 These cases have generally found that
the statutory design or the legislative intent behind sex offender regis-
tration laws is to aid law enforcement 27 in the purpose of protecting
children and the public at large.28
24. Ward, 869 P.2d at 1075 (citing State v. Barton, 609 P.2d 1353, 1356 (Wash. 1980)).
25. See B.G.M., 929 S.W.2d at 606-07; Johnson, 922 P.2d at 1387.
26. The Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits: 1) every law which criminalizes and punishes an action
which was innocent when the action was committed; 2) every law which aggravates a crime, or
makes it greater, than when it was committed; 3) every law which inflicts greater punishment than
prescribed by law when the crime was committed; 4) every law that alters the legal rules of evidence
required at the time of the offense in order to convict the offender. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.)
386, 390 (1798).
The following are ex post facto cases discussing only the registration provisions as non-punitive:
Artway v. Attorney General, 81 F.3d 1235, 1253-67 (3d Cir. 1996), rehearing denied, 83 F.3d 594 (3d
Cir. 1996) [hereinafter Artway II] (finding challenges to public notification provisions unripe); Doe v.
Gregoire, 960 F. Supp. 1478, 1482-87 (W.D. Wash. 1997); Doe v. Pataki, 940 F. Supp. 603, 629-30
(S.D.N.Y. 1996), reversed in part, 120 F.3d 1263 (2d Cir. 1997) [hereinafter Pataki II]; Artway v.
Attorney General, 876 F. Supp. 666, 671-77, 688 (D.N.J. 1995), vacated in part, 81 F.3d 1235 (3d Cir.
1996) [hereinafter Artway I]; Rowe v. Burton, 884 F. Supp. 1372, 1375-81 (D. Alaska 1994); People
v. Taylor, 561 N.E.2d 393, 394 (111. App. Ct. 1990); State v. Myers, 923 P.2d 1024, 1041-43 (Kan.
1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2508 (1997).
The following are ex post facto cases discussing both registration and notification provisions as
non-punitive: Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079, 1087-94 (9th Cir. 1997); Doe v. Pataki, 120 F.3d
1263, 1276-86 (2d Cir. 1997) [hereinafter Pataki III]; W.P. v. Poritz, 931 F. Supp. 1199, 1213-19
(D.N.J. 1996); State v. Noble, 829 P.2d 1217, 1221-24 (Ariz. 1992); State v. McCuin, 808 P.2d 332,
335-42 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991), vacated in part, 829 P.2d 1217 (Ariz. 1992); People v. Starnes, 653
N.E.2d 4, 6-7 (111. App. Ct. 1995); State v. Pickens, 558 N.W.2d 396, 397-400 (Iowa 1997); State v.
Manning, 532 N.W.2d 244, 247-49 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995); State v. Costello, 643 A.2d 531, 532-35
(N.H. 1994); Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 387-405 (N.J. 1995); People v. Afrika, 648 N.Y.S.2d 235,
238-41 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1996); Kitze v. Commonwealth, 475 S.E.2d 830, 832-34 (Va. Ct. App. 1996);
Ward, 869 P.2d at 1067-74; State v. Taylor, 835 P.2d 245, 247-49 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992); Snyder v.
State, 912 P.2d 1127, 1130-31 (Wyo. 1996).
Also notable are: Doe v. Kelley, 961 F. Supp. 1105, 1108-12 (W.D. Mich. 1997) (denying a sex
offender's motion for a preliminary injunction to prevent retroactive application of a community
notification statute); Doe v. Weld, 954 F. Supp. 425, 430-37 (D. Mass. 1996) (denying a sex offender's
motion for a preliminary injunction to prevent retroactive application of a community notification
statute); People v. Adams, 581 N.E.2d 637, 640-42 (I11. 1991) (holding that sex offender registration
was not punishment for purposes of the Eighth Amendment's "cruel and unusual punishment" clause).
27. See Russell, 124 F.3d at 1087; Pataki I1, 120 F.3d at 1285; Artway ii, 81 F.3d at 1265;
Gregoire, 960 F. Supp. at 1484; Weld, 954 F. Supp. at 433; Pataki 1, 940 F. Supp. at 629; Noble, 829
P.2d at 1223; Adams, 581 N.E.2d at 640; Pickens, 558 N.W.2d at 400; Opinion of the Justices of the
Senate, 668 N.E.2d 738, 739 (Mass. 1996); Manning, 532 N.W.2d at 248; Costello, 643 A.2d at 533;
Poritz, 662 A.2d at 374; Afrika, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 239; Kitze, 475 S.E.2d at 832; Ward, 869 P.2d at 1065;
Snyder, 912 P.2d at 1131.
28. See Russell, 124 F.3d at 1087; Pataki 111, 120 F.3d at 1285; Artway H, 81 F.3d at 1264;
Gregoire, 960 F. Supp. at 1484; Weld, 954 F. Supp. at 433; Burton, 884 F. Supp. at 1376; Adams, 581
N.E.2d at 640; Myers, 923 P.2d at 1032; Opinion of the Justices of the Senate, 668 N.E.2d at 739;
Poritz, 662 A.2d at 373-74; Afrika, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 238-39; Kitze, 475 S.E.2d at 832; Ward, 869 P.2d at
162
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For example, the Washington Supreme Court in State v. Ward29
heard a consolidated appeal by two appellants, including one who was
seeking to overturn a conviction for failing to register as a sex offender
and by another convicted sex offender petitioning under Washington's
sex offender registration statute for relief from his duty to register.30
The appellants contended that Washington's sex offender registration
statute was not applicable to either of them because it was unconstitu-
tional under the ex post facto, equal protection, and due process provi-
sions of the United States and Washington Constitutions. 31
In addressing the due process claim, the court held that sex offender
registration is nonpunitive in nature and is a collateral consequence of a
conviction, which does not impose a duty on a court to advise defendants
prior to accepting a guilty plea.32 The court also held that registration is
not punishment in determining that retroactive application of the registra-
tion requirement does not violate the Ex Post Facto clause of the United
States and Washington constitutions. 33
In arriving at these conclusions, the court found that "registration
alone imposes no significant additional burden on offenders." 34 The
court supported this conclusion by noting that the state's sex offender
registration law only requires offenders to provide information not
already in the hands of the authorities. 35
In addition, the court reasoned that the state's public disclosure of
a registrant's information is limited to only relevant information neces-
sary to protect the public to whom the offender may pose a threat. 36
Furthermore, the court found that the information released imposed no
1065; Snyder, 912 P.2d at 1131.
29. 869 P.2d 1062 (Wash. 1994).
30. Ward, 869 P.2d at 1065-66.
31. Id. at 1065.
32. Id. at 1076.
33. Id. at 1074.
34. Id. at 1069; see also Pataki II, 940 F. Supp. 603, 630 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that registra-
tion "does not impose a substantial affirmative disability or restraint"); Burton, 884 F. Supp. at 1378
(finding any affirmative restraint resulting from registration to be de minimis); State v. Manning, 532
N.W.2d 244, 248 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that registration imposes no affirmative disability).
35. Ward, 869 P.2d at 1069.
36. Id. at 1070 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.22.550(1) (1990)); see also Artway I1, 81 F.3d
1235, 1265 (3d Cir. 1996) (finding that disclosure is limited only to law enforcement); Doe v. Weld,
954 F. Supp. 425, 435 (D. Mass. 1996) (finding that the defendant's information would only be
disclosed to those community members making a personal request); State v. Noble, 829 P.2d 1217,
1223 (Ariz. 1992) (finding that disclosure is limited to law enforcement, certain employers, and em-
ployees of government agencies); Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 422 (N.J. 1995) (finding that the level
of disclosure is limited by a tier scheme dependent upon a finding of an offender's dangerousness).
One of the conditions state laws must now comply with in order for a state to receive their
entire share of federal drug control grants under 42 U.S.C.A. § 3756 is that law enforcement agencies
must release relevant information to protect the public. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 14071(e) (1994 & Supp.
1997); 42 U.S.C.A. § 14071(g)(2)(A) (Supp. 1998). Cf. Bob Moen, Local Police Unprepared for New
Notification Law, GRAND FORKS HERALD, Aug. 4, 1997, at 2A (describing the passage of a federal law
as the reason for recent changes to the notification provisions of N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-15).
1998]
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additional burden on the registrant since the records were already availa-
ble to the public. 37 The court then reasoned arguendo that even if there
is any public stigma on registrants, it is caused by the public's reaction
to the information, not from any intentionally imposed "punitive effect"
caused by the release of the information. 38
The court was unpersuaded that registration would place a lifelong
"badge of infamy" on registrants. 39 The court reasoned that no life-
long burden could come from a registration requirement which is
imposed for a definite number of years after a conviction and can be
relieved by a superior court upon a showing by an offender's petition
that future registration no longer serves the statute's purpose. 40 The
court also concluded that any additional focus a sex offender has in a
police investigation of a sex crime is a result of the conviction, not
registration. 4 I
In sum, the court concluded that sex offender registration does
not alter the standard of punishment. 42 Therefore, the court found that
registration is a collateral consequence of a guilty plea.43
In State v. Manning, 44 the Minnesota Court of Appeals faced a simi-
lar challenge when it considered an appeal by a defendant convicted of
violating his probation for failing to register as a sex offender.45 The
defendant contended he was not obligated to register on grounds that the
retroactive application of the Minnesota registration statute was punish-
ment in violation of the Ex Post Facto clauses of the United States and
37. Ward, 869 P.2d at 1069; see also Pataki III, 120 F.3d 1263, 1280 (2d Cir. 1997); Artway 11, 81
F.3d at 1266-67; Doe v. Kelley, 961 F. Supp. 1105, 1109 (W.D. Mich. 1997) (determining that
notification assists the public in getting information that could only be obtained through arduous
research); Noble, 829 P.2d at 1222; People v. Adams, 581 N.E.2d 637, 641 (111. 1991); State v. Pickens,
558 N.W.2d 396, 399 (Iowa 1997); Manning, 532 N.W.2d at 248; Poritz, 662 A.2d at 407; People v.
Afrika, 648 N.Y.S.2d 235, 240 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1996).
38. Ward, 869 P.2d at 1072; see also Kelley, 961 F. Supp. at 1111; Burton, 884 F. Supp. at 1379;
see also Pataki 111, 120 F.3d at 1281 (finding that any punitive effects an offender might feel flow
from the underlying conviction, not registration).
39. Ward, 869 P.2d at 1073.
40. Id. at 1073-74.
41. Id. at 1073; see also In re Reed, 663 P.2d 216, 224 (Cal. 1983) (Richardson, J., dissenting)
(attributing further police attention to other factors, like probation conditions); Snyder v. State, 912
P.2d 1127, 1131 (Wyo. 1996) (--ibuting an offender's prior conviction as the cause of any increased
interest law enforcement has in an offender in any future sex crime investigations).
42. Ward, 869 P.2d at 1076; see also Pataki II, 940 F. Supp. 603, 630 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding
that registration is "essentially ministerial" and '.'does not restrain or inhibit a sex offender's activities
in any significant way"); Burton, 884 F. Supp. at 1378 (finding that registration imposes no obligation to
accept continuing supervision, submit to searches, perform community service, or live in a designated
area). But see Kitze v. Commonwealth, 475 S.E.2d 830, 835 (Va. Ct. App. 1996) (Benton, I., dis-
senting) (concluding that registration is punitive since it deprives offenders of rights they previously
enjoyed).
43. Ward, 869 P.2d at 1076.
44. 532 N.W.2d 244 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
45. State v. Manning, 532 N.W.2d 244, 249 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
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Minnesota Constitutions.46 The court held that Minnesota's sex offend-
er registration statute is not punitive in nature and, therefore, does not
violate the federal and state constitutional prohibitions against ex post
facto laws.47
In doing so, the court found that the statute's requirement that regis-
trants give notice when they relocate does not alone restrain their move-
ments. 48 The court also noted that the registration requirement is limited
to felony offenses.49 The court further supported its reasoning by deter-
mining that registration has not historically been regarded as punish-
ment.50 Rather, registration is another method for law enforcement
agencies to gain easy access to necessary information. 51
The court also refuted the argument that registration burdens
former sex offenders by subjecting them to questioning and investiga-
tion when sex crimes occur locally. 52 The court explained that sex of-
fenders will continue to have due process protections as though there
were no registration requirement in place.53 In the end, the court con-
cluded that the slight burden imposed by increased scrutiny when local
sex crimes occur is not excessive in relation to the registration statute's
regulatory purpose.54
46. Id. at 248.
47. Id. at 249.
48. Id. at 248; see also Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079, 1087 (9th Ci;. 1997); State v. Noble,
829 P.2d 1217, 1222 (Ariz. 1992) (finding that registration does not "affirmatively inhibit or restrain"
an offender's movements); State v. Myers, 923 P.2d 1024, 1041 (Kan. 1996); Ward, 869 P.2d at 1069
(finding that offenders can move freely "within their own community or from one community to
another"); State v. Taylor, 835 P.2d 245, 249 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992). But see Taylor, 835 P.2d at 250
(Agid, J., dissenting) (concluding that an offender's constitutional right to travel and ability to choose
where to live is adversely affected by registration).
49. Manning, 532 N.W.2d at 248; see also Ward, 869 P.2d at 1072 (distinguishing In re Reed, 663
P.2d 216, 216 (Cal. 1983) (criticizing a registration statute's broad application to non-felony crimes));
People v. Adams, 581 N.E.2d 637, 642 (111. 1991) (finding a registration statute to be narrowly tailored
to protect children from child molesters).
50. Manning, 532 N.W.2d at 248 (citing Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 229 (1957)); see
also Russell. 124 F.3d at 1089; Artway II, 81 F.3d 1235, 1265 (3d Cir. 1996); Pataki i, 940 F. Supp.
603, 630 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Rowe v. Burton, 884 F. Supp. 1372, 1378 (D. Alaska 1994); Adams, 581
N.E.2d at 640; People v. Starnes, 653 N.E.2d 4, 6-7 (I11. App. Ct. 1995); State v. Pickens, 558 N.W.2d
396, 400 (Iowa 1997); Kitze v. Commonwealth, 475 S.E.2d 830, 833 (Va. Ct. App. 1996); Ward, 869
P.2d at 1072.
51. Manning, 532 N.W.2d at 248; see also Ward, 869 P.2d at 1072 (finding that registration is a
traditional governmental method used to gather information for law enforcement).
52. Manning, 532 N.W.2d at 248; see also Ward, 869 P.2d at 1073 (concluding that registration
does not make prior sex offenders the focus of every sex crime investigation).
53. Manning, 532 N.W.2d at 248; see also Noble, 829 P.2d at 1223 (finding that registration does
not diminish an offender's right to be free from unconstitutional law enforcement practices); Adams,
581 N.E.2d at 641 (finding that an offender's constitutional safeguards remain in place under a regis-
tration requirement); Ward, 869 P.2d at 1073 (finding that formerly convicted sex offenders continue
to enjoy due process and constitutional provisions afforded to every citizen); Snyder v. State, 912 P.2d
1127, 1131 (Wyo. 1996) (concluding that a "registrant would be afforded all the constitutional
protections to which an accused is entitled").
54. Manning, 532 N.W.2d at 249; see also People v. Taylor, 561 N.E.2d 393, 394 (111. App. Ct.
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Finally, in Doe v. Poritz,55 the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld
New Jersey's registration and notification laws against various statutory
and constitutional attacks brought by a convicted sex offender. 56 In
upholding the law's retroactive application against an ex post facto
challenge, the court refuted the claim that sex offender registration and
notification creates a deterrent. 57 The court reasoned that repetitive and
compulsive offenders who were not deterred by the threat of long-term
incarceration are not likely to be deterred by any disability associated
with these laws.58
On the other hand, the court stated that even if any deterrent is
created by sex offender registration and notification statutes, it is only an
"inevitable consequence of the regulatory provisions." 59 Furthermore,
the court found that even if this "inevitable" deterring impact is poten-
tially severe, the statutes are still non-punitive because their underlying
purpose and implementing provisions are remedial in nature.6
0
C. MINORITY VIEW: SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION AS A DIRECT
CONSEQUENCE
Prior to Breiner, California was the only state finding registration to
be a direct consequence of which defendants must be informed prior to
accepting a guilty plea. 61 In In re Birch62 the California Supreme Court
found that sex offender registration was "unusual and onerous in
nature" when it followed "inexorably" from a conviction for lewd and
1990) (concluding that any limitation registration imposes on sex offenders is made "insignificant"
when weighed against the need to protect the public).
55. 662 A.2d 367 (N.J. 1995).
56. Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 423 (N.J. 1995).
57. Id. at 404.
58. Id.; see also Artway I1, 81 F.3d 1235, 1267 (3d Cir. 1996) (finding that the registration's
effects are not so "draconian" as to constitute "punishment in any way approaching incarceration");
Adams, 581 N.E.2d at 640-41 (finding that a registration requirement is "innocuous" compared to an
"extended period of years in prison").
59. Poritz, 662 A.2d at 405; see also W.P. v. Poritz, 931 F. Supp. 1199, 1214 (D.N.J. 1996) (find-
ing the deterrent purpose of notification to be a "necessary complement" to the remedial statutory
operation of the law).
60. Poritz, 662 A.2d at 388. See People v. Afrika. 648 N.Y.S.2d 235, 240 (N.Y. Ann, Div. IQQ6);
In re B.G.M., 929 S.W.2d 604, 606 (Tex. App. 1996); Kitze v. Commonwealth, 575 S.E.2d 830, 833
(Va. Ct. App. 1996); see also Adams, 581 N.E.2d at 641 (finding the fact that a registration statute
makes no attempt to correct pedophile behavior to be a significant indicator of the statute's
non-punitive intent).
61. B.G.M., 929 S.W.2d at 606. See People v. McClellan, 862 P.2d 739, 745 (Cal. 1993) (conclud-
ing that an error does occur when a trial court fails to advise defendants of their duty to register); Bun-
nell v. Superior Court, 531 P.2d 1086, 1094 (Cal. 1975) (concluding that defendants should be advised
of direct consequences of conviction, such as a registration requirement); In re Birch, 515 P.2d 12, 17
(Cal. 1973) (stating that a registration requirement is a "grave and direct consequence" of a guilty
plea); People v. Cotton, 284 Cal. Rptr. 757, 763-64 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (finding that drug offender
registration is a direct consequence of a conviction). But see People v. McVickers, 840 P.2d 955, 959
(Cal. 1992) (citing with approval State v. Noble, 829 P.2d 1217, 1224 (Ariz. 1992) (concluding that
registration is a collateral consequence)).
62. 515 P.2d 12 (Cal. 1973).
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dissolute conduct. 63 In concluding that the defendant needed to be
advised of the registration requirement, the court noted that it could not
believe a defendant would be aware of this "grave and direct conse-
quences" of a guilty plea for a conviction arising from the conduct of
"urinating in a parking lot at 1:30 in the moming." 64
In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that registration subjects
individuals to "continual police surveillance." 65 Furthermore, the court
reasoned that while "the stigma of a short jail sentence should eventually
fade," registration results in an "ignominious badge" that can remain
for a lifetime. 66
In In re Reed,67 the California Supreme Court considered an appeal
by a defendant convicted of soliciting "lewd and dissolute conduct" for
engaging in a conversation with an undercover vice officer at urinals
located in a public restroom and then briefly masturbating in the offi-
cer's presence.68 The court held that mandatory sex offender registra-
tion for those convicted under a misdemeanor disorderly conduct statute,
such as the one under which Reed was convicted, is unconstitutional
under the California state constitutional prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment. 69 The court found that sex offender registration, as
applied by the California registration statute, was an affirmative disability
or restraint. 70 In particular, the court objected to the fact that registration
was imposed for relatively minor offenses arising from conduct such as
making a "gesture," a "flirtation," or "an invitation for sexual favors"
63. In re Birch, 515 P.2d 12, 16 (Cal. 1973).
64. Id. at 17; see also State v. McCuin, 808 P.2d 332, 342 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) (Clabome, J.,
dissenting) (objecting to the application of registration to crimes not considered aberrant and less likely
to be repeated by an offender).
65. Birch, 515 P.2d at 17. See also State v. Taylor, 835 P.2d 245, 250 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992)
(Agid, J., dissenting) (finding that registration informally subjects sex offenders to being "watched,
investigated, questioned, and accused" by law enforcement); Noble, 829 P.2d at 1223 (finding that a
deterrent effect is created because an offender's location is easily ascertained by law enforcement
through registration); In re Reed, 663 P.2d 216, 218 n.5 (Cal. 1983) (paraphrasing the movie
"Casablanca" by indicating that registration will lead to a rounding up of the usual suspects); Otto M.
Kaus & Ronald E. Mallen, The Misguided Hand of Counsel-Reflections on "Criminal Malpractice,"
21 UCLA L. REV. 1191, 1222 (1974) (stating that registration's presumable purpose means "a series of
command performance lineups").
66. Birch, 515 P.2d at 17. Under California's sex offender registration statute, registration could
be imposed for the duration of the offender's life. Id. at 16-17.
67. 663 P.2d 216 (Cal. 1983).
68. Reed, 663 P.2d at 221. Although denied by Reed, the police officer claimed Reed solicited
him during the conversation. Id.
69. Id. at 222. The impact of Reed as binding precedent in California has been sharply curtailed.
See People v. Fioretti, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 367, 372 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (finding that Reed's holding is
properly limited to the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the California Constitution and sex
offender registration being applied to defendants convicted of a misdemeanor).
70. Reed, 663 P.2d at 218. The court did not find it dispositive in arriving at its decision in this
case that registration has not "historically been regarded as punishment." Id. at 219. But see Noble,
829 P.2d at 1222 (citing Birch, 515 P.2d at 17, as supporting the proposition that sex offender
registration has historically been viewed as punishment).
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made in a "public place." 7 1 Therefore, the court concluded that the
continued penalty inflicted by sex offender registration was dispropor-
tionate to the crime for which the defendant was convicted.
72
Despite having decided Birch in 1973, California remained the only
state to hold that registration is a direct consequence of a guilty plea
which requires admonishment until Breiner.73 All other states that had
decided the issue of whether registrants need to be advised by trial court
of their duty to register ruled the exact opposite. 74 Furthermore, despite
Birch's finding that registration is punishment, courts have almost uni-
versally found that sex offender registration is not punishment in de-
ciding constitutional challenges to registration statutes. 75 Consequently,
there was little to indicate that even a plurality of the North Dakota
Supreme Court would adopt the minority position in Breiner.
III. ANALYSIS
Writing for the plurality in Breiner, Justice Meschke explained that
the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure require trial courts to
personally inform defendants who enter guilty pleas about the conse-
quences of their plea to ensure that the plea has a factual basis and is
voluntary. 76 The plurality also explained that a trial court need only
advise defendants of the direct consequences of the plea, not those which
can be characterized as collateral. 77
The plurality noted that many appellate courts view the conse-
quence of registration as a sexual offender to be collateral, so that a trial
court's failure to advise defendants of the need to register does not
constitute grounds for allowing a withdrawal of a guilty plea.78 The plur-
ality explained the reasoning behind the majority view as being that sex
71. Reed, 663 P.2d at 220.
72. Id. at 222. The court also questioned the effectiveness of the California registration statute as
a law enforcement tool designed to aid criminal investigation. Id. at 219. See also April R. Bedarf,
Note, Examining Sex Offender Community Notification Laws, 83 CAL. L. REV. 885, 899-903 (1995)
(discussing problems with registration being used as a tool for law enforcement).
73. See In re B.G.M., 929 S.W.2d 604, 606 (Tex. App. 1996) (stating that California was the only
state following the holding that registration constitutes a direct consequence of conviction).
74. See supra footnote 23 for a listing of cases holding that trial courts need not advise defendants
of their duty to register prior to accepting a guilty plea.
75. See supra footnote 26 for a listing of cases finding that registration does not constitute
punishment.
76. State v. Breiner, 562 N.W.2d 565, 567 (N.D. 1997). Justice Meschke delivered the plurality
opinion with which Justice Maring concurred. Id. at 565.
77. Id. at 567 (citing State v. Dalman, 520 N.W.2d 860, 863 (N.D. 1994); Houle v. State, 482
N.W.2d 24, 30 (N.D. 1992)).
78. Id. (citing State v. Young, 542 P.2d 20,22 (1975); B.G.M., 929 S.W.2d 606-07; State v. Ward,
869 P.2d 1062, 1075 (Wash. 1994); Johnson v. State, 922 P.2d 1384, 1387 (Wyo. 1996); Licia A.
Esposito, Annotation, State Statutes or Ordinances Requiring Persons Previously Convicted of Crime to
Register with Authorities, 36 A.L.R. 5th 161, § 9 (1996)).
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offender registration laws are "largely remedial, not punitive, and are
designed to facilitate law enforcement and protect children."7 9
However, instead of adopting this view, the plurality was persuaded
by California's minority rule holding sexual offender registration to be
a direct consequence which requires sentencing courts to advise defen-
dants of the registration requirement prior to accepting the guilty plea.S0
The plurality accepted the California Supreme Court's rationale that a
registration requirement "imposes a grave, and even onerous, additional
punishment, especially for misdemeanor offenses." 8' The plurality con-
cluded that this reasoning corresponds with the statutory obligation of
sentencing courts under North Dakota's registration law.8 2
The plurality explained that regardless of the remedial aspect of the
law, the North Dakota Legislature "clearly imposed a duty on the
sentencing court to inform a pleading defendant about the consequence
of the conviction." 8 3 The plurality concluded that the statutory duty
under the registration law must be stated on the record and corresponds
with the procedural duties relating to advising defendants of possible
79. Id. In asserting that registration was remedial and non-punitive, the State of North Dakota
analogized the need to register as a sex offender to the remedial nature of North Dakota's
administrative procedures of suspending drivers' licenses after a conviction for driving under the
influence. Brief for Appellee at 13, Breiner, 562 N.W.2d 565 (N.D. 1997) (No. 960298) (citing State
v. Zimmerman, 539 N.W.2d 49, 56 (N.D. 1996)).
80. Breiner, 562 N.W.2d at 567 (citing People v. McClellan, 862 P.2d 739, 749 (Cal. 1993), and
In re Birch, 515 P.2d 12, 16 (Cal. 1973)).
81. Id. The plurality opinion then quoted the following portion of In re Birch:
[I]n view of the unusual and onerous nature of the sex registration requirement that
follows inexorably from a conviction . . . the trial court's duty surely included an
obligation to advise petitioner of this sanction prior to accepting his guilty plea.
While petitioner possibly might have suspected that a guilty plea could result in a short
jail sentence, we cannot believe that he was aware that as a consequence of urinating in
a parking lot at 1:30 in the morning he would be required to register as a sex offender.
Certainly counsel would have advised him of this grave and direct consequence of his
guilty plea; in the absence of counsel the responsibility for such advice rested with the
court. Without this advice, we conclude that petitioner's waiver of counsel and plea of
guilty cannot be regarded as having been knowingly and intelligently made.
Id. (quoting Birch, 515 P.2d at 16-17).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 567. The plurality then quoted the following portion of N.D. CENT CODE § 12.1-32-
15(2):
After a person has pled guilty to or been found guilty of a crime against a child or an
attempted crime against a child, or after a person has pled guilty or been found guilty as
a sexual offender, the court shall impose, in addition to any penalty provided by law, a
requirement that the person register, within ten days of coming into a county in which the
person resides or is temporarily domiciled, with the chief of police of the city or the
sheriff of the county if the person resides in an area other than a city. The court shall
require a person to register by stating the requirement on the court records.
Id. at 567-68 (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-15(2) (Supp. 1995)). The North Dakota Legislature
amended N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-15 in 1997. While the quoted text has not changed, the section
quoted is now N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-15(3), not N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-15(2).
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punishment under Rule 11 of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal
Procedure.84
In this case, the plurality noted that the registration requirement
was not stated on the record, nor was any record put forth that Breiner
was informed of the registration requirement by his counsel.8 5 The
plurality then noted that an attorney has a duty to inform clients about
relevant consequences of the charge and plea so defendants can make an
informed decision. 86
The plurality then remanded the case to the trial court for an eviden-
tiary hearing on whether Breiner knew of the sex offender registration
requirement prior to pleading guilty.87 If Breiner did know, a failure to
inform him was only harmless error and the withdrawal of the guilty plea
could be appropriately denied.88
A. CHIEF JUSTICE VANDEWALLE'S CONCURRENCE
Chief Justice VandeWalle agreed with the plurality's conclusion that
section 12.1-32-15(2) of the North Dakota Century Code imposes a
duty on trial courts to state the registration requirement on the record,
but only after a defendant has already pled or been found guilty. 8 9
Chief Justice VandeWalle found it conceivable, if not probable, that had
Breiner been informed of the registration requirement by the sentencing
court, he would have immediately moved to withdraw his guilty plea. 90
If that had happened, the trial court probably would have found the
motion timely as a "fair and just reason" under Rule 32(d)(3) of the
North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure. 91 However, the Chief Justice
found it difficult to conclude that a withdrawal of a guilty plea to correct
a "manifest injustice" was necessary because it stretched his imagination
that any innocent person would plead guilty to a crime of this nature,
even with a mild sentence, regardless of the registration requirement. 92
Chief Justice VandeWalle stated that he was adhering to the court's
position in State v. Dalman,93 in which the court held that defendants
need not be advised of collateral consequences of a guilty plea under the
plain language of Rule 11(b) of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal
84. Breiner, 562 N.W.2d at 568.
85. Id.
86. Id. (citing Fargo v. Bommersbach, 511 N.W.2d 563, 566 (N.D. 1994)).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. (VandeWalle, C.J., concurring).
90. Id. at 570.
91. id. The "fair and just reason" motion has a less serious burden for defendants to meet than
the "manifest injustice" motion used by the plurality. See N.D. R. CRIM. P. 32(d)(3).
92. Id. at 568.
93. 520 N.W.2d 860 (N.D. 1994).
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Procedure. 94 The Chief Justice concluded that failing to adhere to Dal-
man "opens the veritable can of worms to an unending list of argu-
ments" of consequences defendants should be advised of prior to accept-
ing a guilty plea. 95 However, the Chief Justice concluded that Dalman
was distinguishable since the duty to advise defendants in this case came
from section 12.1-32-15(2) of the North Dakota Century Code.
96
Chief Justice VandeWalle was not particularly persuaded by the
California decisions upon which the plurality relied.97 The Chief Justice
noted the differences between the facts in this case and the facts in
Birch.98 In Birch, the defendant appeared without counsel to plead guil-
ty to a charge of lewd and dissolute conduct resulting from an incident
where he "urinated facing a retaining wall which was approximately for-
ty feet from a restaurant." 99 In this case, Breiner appeared with counsel
to plead guilty to an offense involving a sexual act with a minor.100
Chief Justice VandeWalle also criticized the plurality's reliance up-
on People v. McClellan.10' He noted that McClellan relied on Bunnell v.
Superior Court.102 The Chief Justice stated that Bunnell's statement
about registration being a direct consequence of conviction is akin to dic-
ta, since the issue of whether registration constitutes a direct consequence
of conviction was not at issue in that case. 103
On the other hand, Chief Justice VandeWalle described McClellan as
being significant in that, unlike in Breiner's case, the California Supreme
Court denied a defendant's request to withdraw his guilty plea.104 The
Chief Justice noted that the California Supreme Court did so on the
94. Breiner, 562 N.w.2d at 568 (VandeWalle, C.J., concurring).
95. Id.
96. Breiner, 562 N.W.2d at 568. In Dalman, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that trial
courts do not need to advise defendants that deportation is a possible consequence of pleading guilty to
an offense since deportation is a collateral consequence of conviction under Rule 11 of the North
Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure. State v. Dalman, 520 N.W.2d 860, 862-63 (N.D. 1992).
97. Breiner, 562 N.W.2d at 569.
98. Id. (citing In re Birch, 515 P.2d 12, 13 (Cal. 1973)).
99. Id. (quoting Birch, 515 P.2d at 13).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 569. In McClellan, the California Supreme Court found that a defendant had waived
his claim of error by failing to object timely to the trial court's failure to advise him of his need to
register as a sex offender. People v. McClellan, 862 P.2d 739, 746 (Cal. 1993). The court found the
claim untimely since the defendant learned about his need to register at sentencing and could have
objected to it at that time. Id.
102. Breiner, 562 N.W.2d at 569 (VandeWalle, C.J., concurring) (citing Bunnell v. Superior
Court, 531 P.2d 1086, 1094 (1975)).
. 103. Id. Chief Justice VandeWalle noted that Bunnell was a murder case dealing with the issue
of double jeopardy, and in assessing the consequences of a guilty plea, the court noted that a
defendant's right to counsel, a jury trial, to confront and cross examine witnesses, and against
self-incrimination must appear on the record. Id. The Bunnell court then stated that a defendant must
be advised of direct consequences such as any registration requirement. Id. (citing Bunnell, 531 P.2d
at 1094).
104. Id.
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grounds that the defendant's motion was untimely, since the defendant
failed to object when he became aware of the registration requirement at
the time of sentencing. 105 Chief Justice VandeWalle stated that the Mc-
Clellan court found that the only evidence presented by the defendant
was his own assertion on appeal that he would not have plead guilty had
he known about the registration requirement. 106 Therefore, relying up-
on McClellan, the Chief Justice allowed withdrawal of the guilty plea
since, had Breiner been informed of the registration requirement at sen-
tencing, he would have probably motioned for and been granted an
immediate withdrawal of his guilty plea by the trial court as a "fair and
just" reason under Rule 32(d)(3) of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal
Procedure.107
B. JUSTICE NEUMANN'S DISSENT
Justice Neumann contended that the "plain, unambiguous lan-
guage" of section 12.1-32-15(2) of the North Dakota Century Code
requires the trial court to impose a registration requirement on a sex
offender as it would a sentence. 108 Under Justice Neumann's reasoning,
the trial court in this case did not impose such a requirement on Brein-
er.109 Therefore, Breiner complained of a consequence that did not ap-
ply to him."I0 Hence, Justice Neumann concluded that the trial court's
decision to deny Breiner's motion to withdraw his guilty plea should be
affirmed. I I I
C. JUSTICE SANDSTROM'S DISSENT
Justice Sandstrom dissented on the grounds that the majority view
should be followed.l1 2 Justice Sandstrom found that no "manifest injus-
tice" results from a trial court's failure to advise defendants at the time
105. See id. (citing McClellan, 862 P.2d at 746).
106. Id. Chief Justice VandeWalle also stated that the McClellan court noted that the prosecution
did not have an opportunity to contest the assertion nor did the trial court have occasion to look into the
veracity of the defendant's assertion. Id.
107. Id. at 570.
1R __, (NemInn I.. dissenting. Chief tice Vnn-dWae stat-d that h 1i not decide , he
issue of whether the trial court needed to impose the registration under section 12.1-32-15(2) of the
North Dakota Century Code because neither Breiner nor the State raised it. Id. at 569-70 n.I
(VandeWalle, C.J., concurring).
109. Id. at 570 (Neumann, J., dissenting).
110. See id.
111. Id.
112. Id. (Sandstrom, J., dissenting). Justice Neumann joined Justice Sandstrom's dissent. Id.
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they enter a guilty plea of their statutory duty to register as a sexual of-
fender.113 This is because "registration as a sex offender is a collateral,
not a direct, consequence of conviction."
114
Justice Sandstrom contended that the trial court's statutory duty
under section 12.1-32-15(2) of the North Dakota Century Code "specifi-
cally attaches after, not before, a guilty plea or verdict." 115 Justice Sand-
strom reasoned that the purpose of the law's requirement that defendants
be advised of their duty to register is not for the defendant's benefit, but
to promote compliance.11 6 Therefore, Breiner should not be exempted
from compliance with the law and had no cause to complain of a proce-
dural irregularity. 117
Justice Sandstrom specifically rejected the plurality's adoption of
the minority view that sex offender registration is onerous by nature and
follows directly from a conviction.118 Justice Sandstrom noted that Brein-
er's conviction was a matter of public record.ll 9 Furthermore, Justice
Sandstrom found that the purpose of having sex offenders advise law
enforcement of their location is "remedial, protective, and a minimal
burden."1 20
IV. IMPACT
The most obvious impact this decision will have is in the way trial
courts in North Dakota will have to inform defendants pleading guilty to
a "crime against a child,"121 a sexual offense,122 or an attempt at any of
113. Id.
114. Id. (quoting Breiner, 562 N.W.2d at 567). Justice Sandstrom quoted this from the plurality
opinion and stated that this constituted a concession by the plurality that sex offender registration is a
collateral consequence of conviction. See id. The validity of such a conclusion by Justice Sandstrom
is debatable since the plurality explicitly stated that they were not adopting the view that registration is
a collateral consequence of a conviction. See Breiner, 562 N.W.2d at 567.
115. Id. at 570 (Sandstrom, J., dissenting).
116. Id. (citing State v. Sundquist, 542 N.W.2d 90, 92 (N.D. 1996) (concluding that the purpose
of North Dakota's Stalking Law requirement that a defendant be served with a copy of the law was to
protect the individual who sought the protection order, not the defendant)).
117. Id. at 570.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. (citing State v. Manning, 532 N.W.2d 244, 248-49 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995)).
121. The following crimes, when committed against children, constitute a "crime against a child"
under N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-15: Murder (§ 12.1-16-01), Manslaughter (§ 12.1-16-02), Negli-
gent homicide (§ 12.1-16-03), Simple assault (§ 12.1-17-01), Assault (§ 12.1-17-01.1), Aggravated
assault (§ 12.1-17-02), Reckless endangerment (§ 12.1-17-03), Terrorizing (§ 12.1-17-04), Menacing
(§ 12.1-17-05), Criminal coercion (§ 12.1-17-06), Harassment (§ 12.1-17-07), Stalking (§ 12.1-17-
07.1), Hazing (§ 12.1-17-10), Kidnapping (§ 12.1-18-01), Felonious restraint (§ 12.1-18-02), Unlawful
imprisonment (§ 12.1-18-03), Promoting prostitution (§ 12.1-29-01), Facilitating prostitution (§ 12.1-29-
02), Prostitution (§ 12.1-29-03), and equivalent ordinances. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-15 (1997).
122. Crimes that are defined as sexual offenses under N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-15 are as
follows: Gross sexual imposition (§ 12.1-20-03), Continuous sexual abuse of a child (§ 12.1-20-03.1),
Sexual imposition (§ 12.1-20-04), Corruption or solicitation of minors (§ 12.1-20-05), Sexual abuse of
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these crimes of their duty to register. Procedurally, trial courts are now
responsible for executing the additional duty of notifying sex offenders
of their duty to register prior to accepting their guilty plea, which is
similar to those duties imposed upon the court by Rule 11 of the North
Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure. 123
Defense attorneys counseling defendants who plead guilty to these
crimes should also take note so as to advise their clients of their duty to
register. While not at issue in this case, the plurality opinion noted that
the record did not reflect whether Breiner's counsel had advised him of
his duty to register prior to pleading guilty.124 The plurality then re-
minded attorneys that they have "a duty to inform a client about rele-
vant consequences of the charge and a plea so that the client can make
an informed decision."125
Another implication of this decision will be the possible expansion
of the grounds-for allowing withdrawal of guilty pleas for a trial court's
failure to advise of a direct consequence under Rule 32 of the North
Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure. With Breiner, the plurality deter-
mined that "direct consequences" goes beyond those listed in Rule 11
of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure.126 Exactly what other
consequences, beyond those that the North Dakota Supreme Court has
already decided, fall within this category was not addressed in the
opinion. Only further case law will reveal whether these unanswered
questions will open a "veritable can of worms" in the form of an "un-
ending list of arguments" on what constitutes a direct consequence.1 27
The decision in Breiner may also raise the prospects of a successful
challenge to the retroactive application of North Dakota's sex offender
registration and notification law128 on grounds that it is unconstitutional
under the Ex Post Facto Clause of the North Dakota Constitution.129
Commentators have suggested that adoption of the California approach,
which holds registration to be punishment, would logically mean that sex
offender notification would constitute punishment under an Ex Post
wards (§ 12.1-20-06), Sexual assault (§ 12.1-20-07), Incest (§ 12.1-20-11), Surreptitious intrusion
[after second conviction or a rni-prnemnt to register is imnnsd (S !2.!221-3.!(2)). Use of a minor
in a sexual performance (§ 12.1-27.2-02), Promoting or directing an obscene sexual performance by a
minor (§ 12.1-27.2-03), Promoting a sexual performance by a minor (§ 12.1-27.2-04), Possession of
certain materials prohibited [child pornography] (§ 12.1-27.2-04.1), and any equivalent ordinances.
123. Breiner, 562 N.W.2d at 568.
124. Id.
125. Id. (citing Fargo v. Bommersbach, 511 N.W.2d 563, 566 (N.D. 1994)); see also NORTH
DAKOTA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCT Rule 1.4 (1996).
126. See Breiner, 562 N.W.2d at 568 (VandeWalle, C.J., concurring).
127. Id.
128. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-15 (1997).
129. See N.D. CONST. art. 1, § 18.
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Facto Clause of a state constitution because of the greater burden notifi-
cation imposes.' 30 This is because a large part of the determination of
whether a law may be applied retroactively under ex post facto analysis
depends upon whether the law has the intent or the effect of being puni-
tive. 131 While sex offender registration statutes have repeatedly withstood
constitutional challenge on ex post facto grounds,132 in Breiner, a plural-
ity of the North Dakota Supreme Court has already stated that registra-
tion imposes a "grave, and even onerous, additional punishment." 33
This makes a successful ex post facto challenge to the retroactive appli-
cation of the registration and notification law to sex offenders convicted
ten years prior to August 1, 1995 seem more promising. 134 This is
especially true now that North Dakota's notification provisions have
been strengthened to require that "relevant and necessary registration in-
formation" must now be disclosed to the public deemed to be at risk. 135
V. CONCLUSION
The persuasive impact that the divided decision in Breiner will have
on the rest of the nation is questionable. Besides California, North
Dakota is the only state to hold that registration is a direct consequence
130. Robin L. Deems, Note, California's Sex Offender Notification Statute: A Constitutional Analy-
sis, 33 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 1195, 1208-09 (1996). See also Bedarf, supra note 72, at 919-20 (discussing
In re Reed, 663 P.2d 216, 216-20 (Cal. 1983), as supporting the view that community notification
constitutes punishment). But see People v. Fioretti, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 367, 372 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997)
(finding that the holding of Reed, 663 P.2d at 222, is not susceptible to an interpretation that prevents
the broad application of California's sex offender registration law under the Ex Post Facto Clause of
the California Constitution).
131. See generally Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144 (1960);
Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079 (2d Cir. 1997); Artway II, 81 F.3d 1235 (3d Cir. 1996); Doe v.
Poritz, 662 A.2d 367 (N.J. 1995).
132. Russell, 124 F.3d at 1089; People v. Afrika, 648 N.Y.S.2d 235, 239 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995);
Poritz, 662 A.2d at 387.
133. Breiner, 562 N.W.2d at 567.
134. In analyzing how a state's Ex Post Facto Clause could be used under the California ap-
proach to prohibit the retroactive application of sex offender notification laws, commentators rely
upon the reasoning set forth by state and federal courts which have found that a violation of the Ex
Post Facto Clause occurs when there is public disclosure or notification of the identity of previously
convicted sex offenders. See Deems, supra note 130, at 1209-12; Bedarf, supra note 72, at 920-23.
Cases which hold the retroactive application of notification or disclosure laws as violating the Ex Post
Facto Clause include: Pataki II, 940 F. Supp. 603, 621-29 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Artway 1, 876 F. Supp.
666, 671-79, 685-92 (3d Cir. 1996); Rowe v. Burton, 884 F. Supp. 1372, 1376-81 (D. Alaska 1994);
Myers, 923 P.2d at 1040-43; State v. Babin, 637 So. 2d 814, 823-25 (La. Ct. App. 1994); State v. Payne,
633 So. 2d 701, 702-03 (La. Ct. App. 1993). Also utilizing such reasoning are those cases issuing
temporary restraining orders or temporary injunctions on enforcement of state laws requiring public
notification or disclosure of sex offenders on ex post facto grounds. These cases include: Doe v.
Gregoire, 960 F. Supp. 1478, 1480-87 (W.D. Wash. 1997); Roe v. Office of Adult Probation, 938 F.
Supp. i080, 1087-94 (D. Conn. 1996), vacated 125 F.3d 47 (2d Cir. 1997); Doe v. Pataki, 919 F. Supp.
691, 694-702 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); E.B. v. Poritz, 914 F. Supp. 85, 89-90 (D.N.J. 1996), reversed, 119 F.3d
1077 (3d Cir. 1997).
135. Compare N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-15(11) (1997) with N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-15(10)
(Supp. 1995).
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of a guilty plea which requires admonishment.1 36 On the other hand, the
number of states adopting the majority position or similar reasoning is
substantial.137 Only time will tell whether this plurality opinion by the
North Dakota Supreme Court and it's wholesale adoption of the Cali-
fornia position and reasoning will have any persuasive impact on other
states.
Larry J. Richards
136. See In re B.G.M., 929 S.W.2d 604, 606 (Tex. App. 1996) (stating that California was the
only state adhering to a holding that registration constitutes a direct consequence of conviction).
137. See supra footnotes 23 and 26 for a listing of cases adopting the minority approach or
applying similar reasoning.
